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Coastal Justice:
The Case for Public Access
By Jessica A. Duncan*
55
[T]his homeowner turned to me and said something
I thought I’d never hear on a California beach. . . .
He said he did not like to look out his window and
see people swimming, because it blocked his view.
- Robert LeMond, age 54, responding to being
asked to leave by a sheriff called by a com-
plaining Malibu beachfront homeowner.1
I. Introduction
Malibu’s Zuma Beach is famous as one
of the most beautiful stretches of coastline
in California.  Zuma has long been the des-
tination of surfers, sunbathers, runners, pic-
nickers, and throngs of people who seek to
escape from the heat of inland Southern
California for the solace of the ocean breeze.
Tourists flock from all over the globe to the
home of Baywatch and the glamorous Malibu
way of life.
If you were to visit Zuma one hot sum-
mer day, your experience might go some-
thing like this: As you round the bend on
Pacific Coast Highway, the glinting blue
ocean comes into view.  You then notice the
* Jessica A. Duncan is a J.D. Candidate for
2005 at University of California, Hastings Col-
lege of the Law.  She received a B.A. degree in
Sociology from Pepperdine University in 2001.
After her first year of law school, she interned in
the Legal Enforcement Division at the Califor-
nia Coastal Commission office in Ventura.  Much
of the agency knowledge in this paper is derived
from her experience there.
Ms. Duncan would like to thank Brian
Haughton, esq., and Jon Lycett, esq., for their
guidance in developing this article and Steve
Hudson for explaining the functions and theo-
ries of the California Coastal Commission.  Ms.
Duncan would also like to express appreciation
to Professor Richard Cunningham of Hastings
for invoking her interest in exactions and inspir-
ing this article.
1. Timothy Egan, Owners of Malibu Mansions Cry,
‘This Sand Is My Sand,’ N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, at A1.
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sea of cars in the public parking lot and lin-
ing both sides of the highway.  Sand is barely
visible between all the towels and beach
umbrellas.  You keep driving, looking for a
spot to park but you do not find an empty
space until you’ve reached the end of the
line.  You park, but now you are at the north-
ern end of the bay and you can no longer
see the ocean past the wall of fences, land-
scaping, and majestic private homes.  You
trek back to the public beach, kids and beach
chairs in hand, as cars speed by you on the
highway.  You finally feel the warm sand be-
tween your toes and you start looking for a
spot to sit.  You turn north because the
beach to your south is packed while the
beach in front of the big houses is fairly
empty.  You come to a sign that says “No
Trespassing, Private Property Begins 50 ft.
toward the ocean from this sign.”  You keep
walking but every twenty feet or so another
sign with a similar message protests your
presence.  Although you feel uncomfortable,
you sit down in the dry sand because your
kids want to play now.  About ten minutes
later, a security guard on a red ATV rolls up
and tells you this is private property and you
must leave.
That “private” beach bordering Zuma
is known as Broad Beach.  It is so named
because, prior to its rise in popularity among
the rich and famous as the haven of their
private lives, the beach was wide.  Today,
however, as development on the beach has
accelerated erosion, the distance between
the homes that line the beach and water’s
edge has diminished.2
Residents of Broad Beach are protec-
tive of the sand, not for its value as a public
resource, but rather for its value as their
backyard.  The boundary of their property
reaches as far as the mean high tide line.3
The line where private becomes public can-
not be permanently fixed, however, because
the mean high tide line is ambulatory, mov-
ing with the daily and seasonal tides and
the erosion and accretion of the beach.4
Without a current accurate survey, as a prac-
tical matter, the dry sand on Broad Beach is
considered private property.5   Beach below
the mean high tide line is called “tidelands”
and is held under the public trust, which
means that the state owns the land for the
benefit of the public as a whole.6
California granted jurisdiction and au-
thority to administer the tidelands and pub-
lic beaches to the State Lands Commission
(“State Lands”).7   In holding title to these
public trust lands, State Lands is a property
owner, with the same rights as belong to a
private property owner.8   Since the use of
these lands belongs to the public, the prop-
erty rights inhering in State Lands as trustee
thereof should outweigh those of the indi-
vidual where the interests of the State and
the private property owner conflict.  While
State Lands is committed to protecting pub-
lic access to these lands,9  the agency pres-
ently does not take any offensive steps to
do so beyond what is necessary to accept
2. See STATE OF CALIFORNIA RESOURCES AGENCY, DE-
PARTMENT OF NAVIGATION & OCEAN DEVELOPMENT, AS-
SESSMENT & ATLAS OF SHORELINE EROSION ALONG THE
CALIFORNIA COAST 37, 45 (1977).
3. Lechuza Villas West v. California Coastal Comm’n,
60 Cal. App. 4th 218, 228 (1997).
4. Id. at 235.
5. Kenneth Weiss, A Malibu Civics Lesson: Beach
is Open, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003, at B1.
6. Lechuza, 60 Cal. App. 4th at 235.
7. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 6301, 6216 (Deering
Lexis through 2004 Supp.).
8. See discussion at Section III.B, and infra note 57.
9. Press Release, California State Lands
Comm’n, State Lands Comm’n Increases Coastal Ac-
cess, <http://www.slc.ca.gov/Press_Releases/2003/
August2003CoastalAccessOTDsFinal.doc> (last
modified Aug. 19, 2003) [hereinafter “California
State Lands Press Release”].
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title and administer the tidelands and ease-
ments for the benefit of public.
The California Coastal Commission
(“Coastal Commission”) is the agency
charged with protecting the public’s rights
to access the coast from harm by private
development through the use of its permit-
ting authority.10   The Coastal Commission
can impose conditions on permits in order
to carry out its policy of preserving the
public’s interest in the beach and mitigat-
ing harm to that interest caused by devel-
opment.11   That regulatory approach, how-
ever, has been vigorously challenged by pri-
vate landowners, in especially where the
Coastal Commission has imposed lateral
access conditions (easements allowing the
public to pass across the beach in front of
the development) on the property owner.12
In the battle between public and private
rights, the issue whether these exactions are
unconstitutional takings of private property
continues to be a heated question.
This article focuses on the fight for the
public’s use of the beach and discusses how
the state may combat or minimize challenges
to lateral access conditions.  It is proposed
herein that the public’s interest in the beach
could prevail in litigation and be more ef-
fectively protected if: (1) the Coastal Com-
mission shows that it has legal authority to
impose lateral access conditions on new
proposals for development by meeting the
constitutional test for exactions, (2) the
Coastal Commission and State Lands take
additional steps to coordinate a campaign
for public access, (3) State Lands takes a
more proactive role in the fight for public
access by initiating its own litigation on a
common law nuisance claim, and (4) the
Coastal Commission additionally supports
its exactions by applying background prin-
ciples of nuisance law.
When the Coastal Commission initiates
enforcement proceedings for compliance
with the Coastal Act, or when a property
owner brings a takings action, State Lands
can bolster the Coastal Commission’s efforts
by bringing an action of its own against the
property owner.  This article suggests that
State Lands can bring suit against a private
landowner whose property use causes harm
to public lands and limits public access,
under the public nuisance doctrine.  The
state could exert twice the pressure on the
landowner to comply with administrative
mandates to provide public access, and the
state could also premise its authority to re-
quire access on two different legal grounds,
exerting both regulatory authority and prop-
erty rights. In taking this double-barreled
approach, the state would make the access
requirement harder to defeat.  Thus, the
scale can be tipped back in favor of the
public’s rights as intended by the California
State Legislature, thus equalizing the bal-
ance that has favored the private owner for
so long.
In the ensuing pages, this article dis-
cusses the following: Section II sets forth (A)
why the public should care about access to
the coast, and (B) what legal rights the public
has to access the coast; Section III introduces
(A) the California Coastal Commission, (B)
the State Lands Commission as the agen-
cies responsible for protecting public access
to the coast, and (C) how they coordinate;
Section IV introduces the problem by (A) pre-
senting the example of a case where the
conflict between public and private rights
10.CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30211; See also CALI-
FORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMM’N, CALIFOR-
NIA COASTAL PLAN 153 (Dec. 1975).
11.Id.
12. Among others, see generally Surfside Colony v.
California Coastal Comm’n, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1260 (1991);
Liberty v. California Coastal Comm’n, 113 Cal. App. 3d 491
(1980); Rohn v. Visalia, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1463 (1989);
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828. (1987).
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regarding access to the beach has recently
been litigated, (B) explaining the harm to
the public’s rights, and (C) explaining the
harm to the private property owner’s rights;
Section V sets forth the law applicable to tak-
ings challenges to exactions, including (A)
the essential nexus test, (B) the rough pro-
portionality test, and (C) the nuisance ex-
ception; Section VI applies the law to sug-
gest tools for the agencies to overcome vio-
lations of lateral access easements and chal-
lenges to their exaction.
II. Public Access to the Coast
A. The Public’s Interest in Beach Access
California is defined by its beautiful
shoreline and weather that is perfect for
enjoying the beach.  Access to the beach
seems to be an inherent right that comes
with living in California, and for many people
it was a primary factor in their choice to live
there.  Eighty percent of Californians live
within an hour of the coast.13   Every year,
millions of people from all over the world
visit California’s beaches and  “[s]erving their
needs provides California with jobs and in-
come constituting a valuable part of the
State’s economy.”14
Unfortunately, the southern coast of
California faces severe public access prob-
lems.15  Only 433 of California’s 1,072 miles
of coastline are in public ownership.16   As
the population and beachfront development
have increased, more people have been
crammed into less space on the available
public beaches.17   “Visitor surveys, filled
campgrounds, and jammed parking lots
make clear that even more visitors would
be at the coast if there were room for
them.”18
Beachfront development has “cut off
existing public access to the coastline, used
up available road capacity and off-street
parking, and precluded use of the coastline
area for recreation.”19   This problem is par-
ticularly prominent in Malibu, where thir-
teen miles of Pacific Coast Highway, which
runs parallel to the coast, is flanked by resi-
dential development, blocking views and
access to the beach. 20   People trying to reach
the beach on summer weekends jam the
highway.21   Frequent visitors to the area,
including the author, can attest that it is not
unusual to find Zuma, a public beach,
crowded with people while Broad Beach,
the privately developed beach next to Zuma,
is relatively deserted.
Moreover, development on the beach
has accelerated erosion, diminishing the
amount of land available for public use.22
Not only does this put a further burden on
public access to the beach, but it also costs
the public money.  Because beaches are so
vital to coastal town economies and the way
of life of the residents, the state must spend
millions of dollars to restore sand to eroded
beaches.23   Taxpayer money would not have
to be spent if erosion were prevented in the
first place.  “The principal means to prevent
continued property damage and public cost
should be to control developments in ero-
sion hazard areas.”24
13. Egan, supra, note 1.
14. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION
COMM’N, supra note 10, at 11.
15. Id. at 244.
16. Id. at 152.  Of the remaining miles of coast-
line, 75.3 are “military lands generally not avail-
able for public recreation.”  Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 245.
21. Id. at 245-246.
22. This point is discussed, infra, at Section IV.B.
23. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION
COMM’N, supra note 10, at 44.
24. Id.
Jessica A. Duncan
58
W
e
st 
 N
o
rth
w
e
st
Fall 2004
While regulatory efforts to restrict de-
velopment draw harsh criticism from private
property owners whose rights may be bur-
dened, without such actions by agencies like
the Coastal Commission, the state would
quickly lose what is left of its already disap-
pearing coast.  The beach would become a
resource for the enjoyment of the wealthy
alone and there would be no beach for Cali-
fornians to take their grandchildren to play.
B. The Public Has a Right to Coastal
Access
1. Use of the Tidelands Protected by
the Public Trust
The public interest in natural resources
has been recognized as far back as early
Roman and English law.25   The public trust
doctrine, as carried over into American law,
is the concept that “certain interests are so
particularly the gifts of nature’s bounty that
they ought to be reserved for the whole of
the populace.”26   Resources found to be
within this public interest include navigable
waters and the tidelands.27
Tidelands are those lands lying be-
tween the lines of mean high tide and mean
low tide.28   Thus, all land seaward of the
high water mark is sovereign land, belong-
ing to the state and preserved for public
use.29   The public trust doctrine also has
been applied at times to protect beach
above the mean high tide line.30   The state
holds the tidelands in trust for the public and
must protect the public’s access to certain
uses of the land, including their rights to fish,
hunt, bathe, swim, boat, and general recre-
ation.31   The state “may never alienate trust
property by conveying it to a private owner.”32
The public, therefore, cannot lose its rights
to access and use the tidelands.
As public beaches become increasingly
overcrowded, the public’s interest in pro-
tecting its right to access and use of the
shore also increases.  The people have a
right to use public trust lands “free from
obstruction or interference from private par-
ties.”33   That public right is being encroached
on by private development.  Accordingly, the
California Coastal Plan provides:
Because development adjacent to
such public trust lands and waters
can have an adverse impact on the
public’s rights in them (e.g., devel-
opment may block constitution-
ally guaranteed access to coastal
waters or cause damage such as
erosion . . .), development on or
uses of public and private lands
in the vicinity of trust areas that
would significantly interfere with
or harm the public values of these
areas shall not be permitted.34
The state legislature “is the ultimate
administrator of the tidelands trust” and
“must take into account the overarching
principle of the public trust doctrine that
trust lands belong to the public and are to
25. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970).
26. Id. at 484.
27. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-260 (1971).
28. Id. at 257.
29. Lechuza, 60 Cal. App. 4th at 235; CALIFORNIA COASTAL
ZONE CONSERVATION COMM’N, supra note 10, at 190.
30. 6A-35 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMI-
NENT DOMAIN § 35.02 (2004).
31. Marks, 6 Cal. 3d at 259-260; Sax, supra note
25, at 477.
32. Sax, supra note 25, at 485-486.
33. CALIFORNIA STATE LANDS COMM’N, PUBLIC TRUST
POLICY 2-3 (downloaded on Mar. 27, 2004, on file
with West-Northwest) (updated version available
at <http://www.slc.ca.gov/Policy Statements/
Public_Trust/Public_Trust_Policy.doc>).
34. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION
COMM’N, supra note 10, at 190.
35. CALIFORNIA STATE LANDS COMM’N, supra note 33, 3-4.
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be used to promote public rather than ex-
clusively private purposes.”35   To promote
the public interest, the legislature has made
a policy pronouncement that “the interests
of the people of the state in the preserva-
tion of the coastal zone are ‘fundamental,”36
and has guaranteed the public’s right of ac-
cess under the California Constitution.
2. State Constitutional Guarantee
Article X, Section 4 of the California
Constitution declares that no private entity
owning land fronting on navigable waters of
the state may exclude the public’s “right of
way to such water whenever it is required for
any public purpose. . . and the Legislature
shall enact such laws as will give the most
liberal construction to this provision, so that
access to the navigable waters of this State
shall be always attainable for the people
thereof.”37   After its amendment in 1983, the
constitution also provided that “Public ac-
cess from the nearest public roadway to the
shoreline and along the coast shall be pro-
vided in new development projects.”38
3. California Coastal Act
The people of the state also demon-
strated the importance they place on the
preservation of the coast in passing the
Coastal Initiative in 1976.  The initiative cre-
ated the California Coastal Act (“Coastal
Act”), which declared the coast to be a valu-
able public resource and sought to protect
the ecological balance and the “economic
and social well-being” of the people by pre-
venting the deterioration of the coast.39   A
basic goal of the Coastal Act is to
“[m]aximize public access to and along the
coast and maximize public recreational op-
portunities in the coastal zone consistent
with sound resources [sic] conservation
principles and constitutionally protected
rights of private property owners.”40
In furtherance of this goal, the Coastal
Act makes several key provisions.  It prohib-
its development from interfering “with the
public’s right of access to the sea where ac-
quired through use or legislative authoriza-
tion, including, but not limited to, the use
of the dry sand and rocky coastal beaches
to the first line of terrestrial vegetation.”41
This public access across the beach is called
“lateral” access.  All new beachfront devel-
opments must provide “public access from
the nearest public roadway to the shoreline
and along the coast.”42   This type of access
is called “vertical” access.  (As introduced
above, this article focuses on lateral access,
so all references to “access” hereinafter oc-
cur in that context and exclude application
to vertical access conditions.)  Finally, the
Coastal Act also declares the “scenic and
visual qualities of coastal areas” to be “a re-
source of public importance,” requiring that
“[p]ermitted development shall be sited and
designed to protect views to and along the
ocean and scenic coastal areas . . . and,
where feasible, to restore and enhance vi-
sual quality in visually degraded areas.” 43
36. Notes of Decisions, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
30001, (citing Sierra Club v. California Coastal Zone
Conservation Comm’n., 58 Cal. App. 3d. 149 (1976)).
37. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4.
38. Id.  The section goes on to say: “except
where (1) is inconsistent with public safety. . .
(2) adequate access exists nearby. . . .  Dedicated
accessway shall not be required to be open to
public use until a public agency or private asso-
ciation agrees to accept responsibility for main-
tenance and liability of the accessway.”
39. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30001.
40. Id. § 30001.5(c)
41. Id. § 30211.
42. Id. § 30212.
43. Id. § 30251.
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4. State Lands Act
The State Lands Act, passed in 1938,
established the State Lands Commission
and vested in it the “powers, duties, pur-
poses, responsibilities and jurisdiction” of
the state over public trust lands.44   The leg-
islature gave State Lands exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the tidelands, therefore imposing
a duty on State Lands to ensure that these
lands are administered in a way that pro-
tects the public’s interest.45   In view of pub-
lic trust principles, the State Lands Act also
provided that State Lands has authority over
construction on or bordering on the tide-
lands, and that State Lands may only grant
permission to any beachfront “owner to con-
struct, alter or maintain, groins, jetties, sea
walls, breakwaters, and bulkheads, or any
one or more of such structures” on the tide-
lands if the structure does “not unreason-
ably interfere with the uses and purposes
reserved to the people of the state.”46
Consequently, no structure that unreason-
ably interferes with the public right of ac-
cess to the tidelands may be permitted.
III. The Agencies Charged With Protect-
ing the Public’s Right to Access
A. California Coastal Commission
In 1972, the Coastal Initiative created
the California Coastal Commission and en-
dowed upon it regulatory authority to imple-
ment the policies of the Coastal Zone Con-
servation Plan.47   A landowner proposing
any new development within the designated
coastal zone must first obtain a Coastal
Development Permit (“CDP”) from the Com-
mission.48   In following its duties, the
Coastal Commission cannot approve a per-
mit for a project that is inconsistent with the
Coastal Act’s provisions for public access.49
A denied proposal will be returned to the
applicant with an explanation of why the
project does not conform with the Act and
directions as to what must be done to meet
the Act’s requirements.50
Where the landowner cannot modify
the proposal to comply completely, the
Commission may balance public and private
interests and accept the development, sub-
ject to certain conditions that mitigate the
burden to the public.51   Where a
landowner’s application to build or alter a
development interferes with the public’s
right of access and would be denied, the
Coastal Commission commonly requires
the landowner to record an “offer to dedi-
44. Id. § 6216(a).
45. Id. § 6301.
46. Id. § 6321.
47. Grupe v. California Coastal Comm’n, 166 Cal.
App. 3d 148, 160 n.5 (1985).  The Coastal Initia-
tive was the precursor to the Coastal Act.  The
California Coastal Zone Conservation Plan was
prepared thereunder by the California Coastal
Zone Conservation Committee, which was the
precursor to the California Coastal Commission.
48. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30604.  The “coastal
zone” is not drawn according to any specific for-
mula, but is drawn taking into consideration geo-
logical and topographical characteristics that
make development more or less likely to affect
the beach and ocean.  Political factors are also
taken into consideration.  The coastal zone can
range from less than a mile to many miles in-
ward from the ocean, for example, at Topanga
Canyon.  Id. § 3064(d).
49. Id. § 30211; CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CON-
SERVATION COMM’N, supra note 10, at 153.
50. Author’s experience (the author worked
in the Legal Enforcement Division of the South
Coast California Coastal Commission).
51.CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30212; Liberty, 113
Cal. App. 3d at 491; CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CON-
SERVATION COMM’N, supra note 10, at 154-155.
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cate” (“OTD”) a lateral access easement as
mitigation for allowing the project to go for-
ward.52   Such an easement enables the pub-
lic to use the part of the sandy beach for pas-
sive recreational use, usually from the mean
high tide line to a specified point landward,
such as from the mean high tide line to
twenty-five feet inland, the toe of an existing
dune system, or the face of the seawall.53
B. State Lands Commission
State Lands Commission Chair Cruz
Bustamante stated that one of his “top pri-
orities has been increasing public access to
our beaches.”54   Commissioner Steve Westly
also declared that State Lands “is commit-
ted to guaranteeing Californians’ Constitu-
tional right of access to their coast.”55   State
Lands carries out this goal primarily by ac-
cepting the OTDs for public access that were
recorded as a condition of the Coastal
Commission’s CDPs.
Title to the tidelands and the beach
easements that State Lands accepts is held
in trust for the public.56   As trustee, State
Lands holds legal title to the tidelands but
must administer it for the benefit of the eq-
uitable title holders, who are the people of
California.57   Accordingly, when the devel-
opment of adjoining private land affects its
interest in the trust lands, State Lands must
ensure that the proposed use does not harm
the needs of the public.58
C. How the Agencies Currently Coordi-
nate for Access
When an OTD is recorded pursuant to
a condition imposed by the Coastal Com-
mission on a CDP, that offer does not actu-
ally become available for public use until a
government or nonprofit agency, in particu-
lar State Lands, accepts ownership respon-
sibilities for it; at which point it becomes an
easement held by the entity for the benefit
of the public.59   The easements become a
piece of the public trust for perpetuity and
cannot be abandoned by the state or re-
turned to the property owner.60
The Coastal Commission has been
monitoring OTDs recorded since the early
1980s, but there was no program to encour-
age the OTDs to be accepted until the mid-
1990s.61   At that time, the 21-year time lim-
its on the offers were coming due and they
would have been lost if left to expire.62   The
Coastal Commission formed an active pro-
gram to coordinate the acceptance of the
OTDs, called the “Coastal Access Program,”
52. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30212; Grupe, 166 Cal.
App. 3d at 160; CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION
COMM’N, supra note 10, at 154-155.  The access condi-
tions are of three types: an offer to dedicate, an ease-
ment, or a deed restriction.  The permit will either
require the recording of a deed restriction or an offer
to dedicate the specific segment of property.  The
deed restriction automatically subjects the property
to the condition.  An offer to dedicate becomes an
easement after a public agency or a nonprofit group
“picks up” the offer, agreeing to accept liability and
upkeep responsibilities.  CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30214.
53. E-mail comments from Steve Hudson, Super-
visor of South Coast Legal Enforcement Division of
California Coastal Commission, to the author (Oct.
8, 2004) (on file with author).  “Passive recreational
uses include those activities normally associated with
beach use (e.g., walking, swimming, jogging, sun-
bathing, fishing, surfing). . . .Most accessways required
to meet the provisions of Section 30212 of the [Pub-
lic Resources Code] should provide for at least this range
of uses. . . .” Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 162.
54. California State Lands Press Release, supra note 9.
55. Id.
56. CALIFORNIA STATE LANDS COMM’N, supra note 33, at 2-3.
57. For an understanding of basic trust prin-
ciples, see REST. 3D TRUSTS § 2, Definition of Trust (1959).
58 .Id.
59. Telephone Interview with Linda Locklin,
Manager of Coastal Access Program, California
Coastal Comm’n (Oct. 26, 2004).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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which contacts State Lands, the local gov-
ernments, and any nonprofit agencies that
may be interested, and advises them of the
OTDs that need to be accepted.63   Since
there is such a great backlog of OTDs, in or-
der to ensure no offer is allowed to expire,
the program addresses the OTDs oldest
first.64   Thus, it is usually many years after
the recording of an offer before it is picked
up.65   However, in “special areas” the agency
works by geography, making it top priority to
get all the OTDs in the area accepted.66
That was the case in Malibu.  In the past
few years, the critical need for access and
protection of the fragile beach became ap-
parent to both the Coastal Commission and
State Lands. Consequently, the agencies
have aggressively pursued opening the
easements for public use.67   By December
of 2003, the last of the currently recorded
Broad Beach OTDs had been accepted, and
to date fifty-two of the one-hundred and
eight properties on the beach have lateral
public access easements-thirty-two from
accepted OTDs and the remainder from
deed restrictions.68
IV. The Problem: Conflict of Public and
Private Rights
Despite the acceptance of so many
OTDs and their opening as easements avail-
able for public use, there is so much resis-
tance from the beachfront landowners that
Broad Beach is still virtually unused by the
public.  The following discussion demon-
strates the conflict between public and pri-
vate interests that leaves neither side satis-
fied with the present status of their rights to
the beach.
A. Conflict Example: City of Malibu &
Geffen v. Access for All & the Califor-
nia Coastal Commission
Malibu homeowners may be justified
in worrying about allowing the public on the
beach in front of their homes when a public
easement is imposed.  Steven Spielberg,
Danny Devito, Goldie Hawn, Pierce Brosnan,
Kelsey Grammar, and Barbara Sinatra are
just a few of the celebrities who make Broad
Beach their home.  Homeowners fear that
opening the beach to the public will create
new problems like sanitation and safety,
since there are no public restrooms, trash
service, parking, or lifeguards.69   An extraor-
dinary concern for celebrities like Entertain-
ment mogul David Geffen is that public ease-
ments can give paparazzi and fans easy ac-
cess to an invasion of their private lives.
Geffen, a resident of La Costa Beach,
another private Malibu beach, once came
into his living room to find that people had
wandered in from the pathway alongside his
house that was blocked off by a wooden
gate.70   Geffen had recorded lateral and ver-
tical access OTDs in return for permission
to develop his property, but after the offers
were accepted by the nonprofit agency Ac-
cess for All in 2002, Geffen filed suit seeking
invalidation of the easement.71   Geffen
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.  For more detailed information on
which properties have public access easements,
visit http://www.coastal.ca.gov and click on the
“Broad Beach Public Easement Map” (researched
and prepared in part by the author).
69. Egan, supra note 1.
70. Id.  La Costa Beach suffers from the same
development, erosion, and public access prob-
lems as Broad Beach.
71. 1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18-19, 22-23, 25-26, 32,
City of Malibu v. Access for All, No. BC277034 (Cal. Super.
Ct. L.A. County, Sept. 6, 2002).  The City of Malibu
was initially involved because it claims its interests
in administering its Local Coastal Plan are preju-
diced by the opening of certain public access ways.
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claimed the Coastal Commission violated
the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against
the government “taking” private property for
public use without just compensation.72
In 1983, Geffen applied to the Coastal
Commission for a CDP for “a lot line adjust-
ment. . ., a 950 square foot addition to an
existing garage, guest/maid’s quarters and
a deck, and construction of a swimming pool,
spa and 100 foot long wooden bulkhead with
50 foot side return.”73   The Commission ap-
proved a CDP conditioned on the execution
of OTDs for vertical and lateral access ease-
ments, with the latter to extend from the
mean high tide line up to the foot of the sea-
wall.74   When Geffen later applied for further
construction on the seawall, the Commission
reiterated its condition requiring passive rec-
reational use for the public and forbid him
from interfering with the public’s right of ac-
cess in the easement.75
Geffen’s suit alleges that the
Commission’s policy of requiring “an appli-
cant for a CDP to dedicate land for public
access to and/or along the beach” does not
require “any relationship between the im-
pact of the requested development on pub-
lic access and the required dedication of
land.”76   Geffen claims that he has not “un-
dertaken any activity which interfered with
or otherwise adversely impacted the ability
of the public to access the publicly-owned
portion of the beach adjacent to the Prop-
erty” and without an “essential nexus” be-
tween his actions and the burden on the
public access, the condition is not justified
and the Commission has placed “an exces-
sive, abnormal, and unreasonable burden
on the Property.”77  That unjustified burden,
he argues, violates the Fifth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition against
the “taking of private property for public use
without due process and just compensa-
tion.”78   Geffen also argues it violates the
California Constitution’s prohibition of the
same, and the Coastal Act’s limitation on
the Commission’s power that it may not take
or damage private property.79
B. Harm to the Public’s Right of Access
Property owners, or their homeowner’s
association, have directly interfered with the
public’s access on Broad Beach by erecting
“No Trespassing” signs along the length of
the beach.  The erosional effects of private
development on the beach also indirectly
interfere with the public’s rights by dimin-
ishing the public land on the beach avail-
able for access.
1. Property Owners Directly Interfere
With Right of Access
Although the Coastal Commission at-
tempts to protect public access to the beach
by imposing permit conditions, having a
right to cross the beach on paper does no
72. Id. ¶¶ 140-144.
73. Id. ¶ 17.
74. The text of the condition read: “Lateral
and Vertical Access.  Prior to the transmittal of
a permit, the applicant shall submit evidence of
the acceptance of OTD easements for access
along the shoreline from the mean high tide line
to the toe of the approved bulkhead for the resi-
dence [lateral access] and for access to the
shoreline over a vertical access easement cote-
rminous with an existing 9’ wide Cal Trans ease-
ment on the applicant’s property.  Said vertical
access easement shall be located within an 18’
wide corridor paralleling the western most prop-
erty line of the applicant’s property and shall
provide for a privacy buffer of at least 9’ in width
between the access way on developed property
to the west of the applicant’s holdings.” Id. ¶ 18.
75. Id. ¶ 22.
76. Id. ¶ 124.
77. Id. ¶¶ 126, 129.  The essential nexus test
will be discussed in Section V.B, infra.
78. Id. ¶ 143.
79. Id. ¶¶ 148-150.  California Constitution
Article I § 19; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30010.
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practical good when property owners refuse
to abide by their promises and interfere with
public use.  On Broad Beach, forty-four of
the one hundred and eight properties are
subject to conditions that require the own-
ers to allow lateral access twenty-five feet
inland on their property.80   In 2003, fourteen
of the properties that are required to allow
public access across the property had
posted “No Trespassing” signs like those
quoted in the Introduction above.81   In main-
taining such signs, the property owner in-
terferes with the public’s right of access re-
quired by the conditions because the signs
lead the public to believe that going any
further on the beach is illegal when, in fact,
it is not.  Since discovering this problem,
the Commission has imposed “no sign” con-
ditions, seeking to prevent such interference
to public access.  However, in 2003, six of
the fourteen properties with a “no sign” re-
striction were in violation.82   The eviction of
beachgoers by security guards on ATVs pro-
vided by the homeowner’s association also
directly interferes with the CDP requirements
of public access because the public is
chased off of the beach it has a right to use.
2. Science Shows Development Dimin-
ishes Beach Availability
In the Staff Report accompanying the
CDP for Geffen’s construction of a seawall
on the beach in front of his house, the Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission made findings
that the seawall would cause erosion to the
beach.  In explaining how the development
would cause erosion and harm to the
public’s rights, the report stated:
Scour is the removal of sand or
other beach material from the
base of a vertical surface, due to
wave action.  When waves impact
a hard surface. . . some of the en-
ergy may be reflected down-
ward. . . .  This effect can remove
material seaward of the [develop-
ment] and create an erosional
trench or scour trough.83
. . . .
Even structures located above the
mean high tide line. . . may have
an impact on shoreline processes
as wave energy reflected by those
structures contributes to erosion
and steepening of the shore pro-
file and, ultimately, to the extent
and availability of tidelands.84
These findings are supported by inde-
pendent scientific evidence.  Understand-
ing how the coastal process works helps to
explain why development on the beach re-
sults in erosion. In a natural state, the
amount of sand on the beach is balanced
80. Author’s experience, supra note 50. (Based on
author’s review of all property deeds and permits on
those properties.) The majority of the conditions call
for lateral access twenty-five feet inland from the mean
high tide line.  Alternative phrasing includes: between
the mean high tide line and twenty-five feet inland
from the daily ambulatory water line, or 25’ inland
from the daily ambulatory water line.  A couple of
properties grant access from the MHTL to the first
strip of vegetation or the toe of the bluff.
81. Id.
82. Id. (Also based on two surveys of signs on
the beach conducted by the author between June
and August 2003.)
83. Coastal Development Permit Application
No 4-99-268 (Geffen), at 16 (available for review
in Ventura County Coastal Commission Office).
For more on Staff Reports, see infra Section VI.A.
84. Id. at 25.
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by a cycle of erosion and deposition of sedi-
ment, which is carried out by two types of
currents: tidal and longshore.85   Tidal cur-
rents act perpendicular to the shore.  As
waves retreat from the beach, they draw
sand back with them, which would quickly
erode the beach if the waves did not also
deposit sand as they hit the beach.86   Tidal
currents carry in sand that has been trans-
ported from upcoast by longshore currents,
which act parallel to the shore.87
A structure on the beach interferes with
the cycle of sand transport, causing greater
erosion both because of tidal action at the
foot of the structure and because of in-
creased loss of sand to longshore currents.88
Development on the beach increases both
the height and strength of a wave because
the wave energy is magnified as it is reflected
by the impact.89   Even when the develop-
ment is not within the direct impact of the
wave (such as a seawall), an upland struc-
ture (such as a home) can still increase the
wave energy because it makes the shore-
line harder and less absorbent of impacts.90
The increased power of the wave hitting the
beach causes greater scour, or erosion, at
the base of the development.91   Normally,
tidal action carries in approximately the
same amount of sand from longshore cur-
rents that it carries away from the beach.92
However, when there is greater scour as a
result of development, tidal action carries
more sand away than it deposits from the
incoming longshore currents, creating an
imbalance of erosion and sediment depo-
sition.93   Longshore currents then carry
away the sand and it is lost from the local
system.94   Structures built on the beach can
also redirect the natural currents and con-
tribute to accelerated erosion.95
The Coastal Commission’s Staff Report
accompanying the Geffen CDP also found
that the effects of global warming could com-
bine with development on the beach to fur-
ther exacerbate erosion.96   Global warming
causes sea levels to rise and intensifies
storms, which both result in increased wave
heights and wave energy.97   As discussed
above, stronger waves accelerate erosion
when they connect with the developed
shore.  Also, sea level rise exposes more
landward beach to scour.98   One scientist
predicted that “sea level rise could cause
beaches to erode as much as 200 feet” dur-
ing this century.99
As erosion continues over time, the
mean high tide line gets closer to the devel-
85. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMM’N,
supra note 10, at 43; ROBERT M. SORENSEN, BASIC
COASTAL ENGINEERING 27-202 (Michael McCormick
& Rameswar Bhattacharyya eds., 1978).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. SORENSEN, supra note 85, at 196-202.
89. Id. at 27.
90. Id. at 180.
91. Id. at 202.
92. Id. at 198; CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSER-
VATION COMM’N, supra note 10, at 43.
93. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION
COMM’N, supra note 10, at 11.
94. SORENSEN, supra note 85, at 198.
95. Id. at 196-198.
96. Coastal Development Permit, supra note 83, at 24.
97. Id.  See also STATE OF CALIFORNIA RESOURCES
AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF NAVIGATION & OCEAN DEVEL-
OPMENT, ASSESSMENT & ATLAS OF SHORELINE EROSION
ALONG THE CALIFORNIA COAST 39 (1977) (“A gradual
but continuing trend in the rise of the sea level
and subsidence of the land mass in localized
areas are contributing factors to erosion.”)
98. Coastal Development Permit application,
supra note 83, at 24.
99. According to Stephen Leatherman, director
of the Laboratory for Coastal Research and Inter-
national Hurricane Center at Florida International
University.  Kevin Lollar, Paradise at Risk: Most Erosion
Stems From Human Actions, The News-Press, July 28,
2002, at <http://www.floridacapitalnews.com/erosion/
stories/science1.htm> (last visited October 11, 2004).
Jessica A. Duncan
66
W
e
st 
 N
o
rth
w
e
st
Fall 2004
opment.  Where there is not already a sea-
wall in place, one will have to be built to
protect the home from waves, and eventu-
ally the ocean will reach the wall.100   Since
the public lands reach up to the mean high
tide line, if the water reaches the develop-
ment, the only land that was available to
public access and use will be underwater.101
Thus, erosion caused by the beachfront de-
velopment harms the public’s rights by elimi-
nating the public’s property.
Southern California has heavily devel-
oped its coastal areas; consequently, the
region has suffered increased erosion of its
beaches.102   For instance, historical aerial
pictures provide evidence of actual erosion
caused by development on Broad Beach,
showing a narrowing of the beach since its
development and an increasing number of
seawalls constructed.103   Although the natu-
ral processes can be restored and erosion
corrected by reducing the intensity of use
and development on the beach,104 abandon-
ment or removal of development is not po-
litically feasible and “results in an economic
and social loss.”105   Accordingly, the Califor-
nia Coastal Plan instructs the Coastal Com-
mission to prevent additional erosion and
property damage by controlling develop-
ment “to the maximum extent possible.”106
C. Burden on the Private Right to
Property
No person shall . . . be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for pub-
lic use, without just compensation.107
The right to own private property is a
fundamental American right.  In enacting the
Fifth Amendment, the Framers of the Con-
stitution were addressing the concern that
the government may unjustly redistribute
the benefits and burdens of society by tak-
ing property, or one of the sticks in the
bundle of rights that accompany property
ownership, from one individual and giving
it to another.108   The government may only
burden the individual’s property rights in
this way if the benefit flows to the public at
large, and if so, the public must pay for it.109
Property rights, though strictly guarded,
are not absolute.  Substantial public interest
may justify placing a burden on the property
owner.110   The courts have upheld land-use
regulations that burden the private property
owner where the state has “reasonably con-
cluded that ‘the health, safety, morals, or
general welfare’ would be promoted by pro-
hibiting particular contemplated uses of
land.”111   “A use restriction on real property
may constitute a ‘taking’ if it is not reason-
ably necessary to the effectuation of a sub-
stantial public purpose,” and it “frustrate[s]
the distinct investment-backed expectations”
of the private property owner.112
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. STATE OF CALIFORNIA RESOURCES AGENCY, SU-
PRA NOTE 2,at 45
103. The Coastal Commission and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers have aerial photos on file at
their offices.  Another good reference to see such
photographs is the Assessment & Atlas of Shoreline
Erosion Along the California Coast, supra note 2.
104. STATE OF CALIFORNIA RESOURCES AGENCY, su-
pra note 102, at 38.
105. Id.
106. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION
COMM’N, supra note 10, at 44.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
108. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
109. Id. at 123-124.
110. Id. at 125.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 127.
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Courts have consistently upheld the
constitutionality of the use of the police
power to regulate land use, including requir-
ing the dedication of land as a condition of
development.113   However, a condition re-
stricting property use can only go so far in
burdening the individual; at some point, the
restriction ceases to be a proper exercise of
the regulatory power and becomes a viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment.114   When that
turning point occurs is ultimately a ques-
tion of fairness under the circumstances.115
According to the Coastal Commission, the
“Coastal Plan recognizes fully that the own-
ership and use of private property are fun-
damental,” and does not restrict private
property in a way that significantly affects
the property owner’s expectations.116
V. The Law: Takings, Exactions, and
Nuisances
A. History
The United States Constitution guar-
antees that private property will not be taken
by the government for the public’s benefit
without compensation.  However, that right
does not mean that a property owner may
do whatever he pleases with the property.
It is an axiom of common law that the “use
of property is subject to reasonable re-
straints to avoid societal detriment.”117
Thus, the California Supreme Court has
stated, “there is no constitutional right to
own property free from regulation.”118   The
federal courts have also indicated that regu-
lation of property to control a nuisance is
not a taking.119   Not surprisingly, in 1971,
when the California Supreme Court exam-
ined the constitutionality of land-use exac-
tions in Associated Homebuilders, etc., Inc. v. City
of Walnut Creek,120  the court upheld the va-
lidity of a condition imposed on a develop-
ment because there was a “reasonable rela-
tion” between the condition imposed and
the need generated by the project.121   Al-
though Associated Homebuilders arose in the
context of a subdivision development and
payment of a mitigation fee, in a string of
cases decided in 1985, the California Courts
of Appeals applied the Associated Home Build-
ers “reasonable relation” standard to takings-
based challenges to permits issued by the
Coastal Commission.122   These decisions
held that, while the condition must be re-
lated to the need generated by the devel-
opment, the “relation” does not need to be
a direct nexus.123   Rather, “it is enough that
the project ‘contributes, at least in an inci-
dental manner’ to the need for a particular
extraction.”124
Similarly, in Whaler’s Village Club v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission, the court rejected
the claim that requiring an applicant to dedi-
cate a lateral public access easement as a
condition to build a rock revetment consti-
tuted a taking.125   The court held that the
113. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. Walnut
Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 638-640 (1971).
114. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415-416 (1922).
115. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
116. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION
COMM’N, supra note 10, at 19.
117. Whaler’s Village Club v. California Coastal
Comm’n, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240, 253 (1985)(citing
People v. Byers, 90 Cal. App. 3d 140, 147-148 (1979)).
118. Id. at 253.
119. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915);
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Costal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
120. 4 Cal. 3d 633 (1971).
121. Id. at 648.
122. See Remmenga v. California Coastal Comm’n, 163
Cal. App. 3d. 623, 627 (1985); Whaler’s Village, 173
Cal. App. 3d at 256; Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 171.
123. Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d. at 165.
124. Whaler’s Village, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 260-261.
125. Id. at 261.
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public’s right to use the tidelands for gen-
eral recreation purposes must be protected,
reasoning that there is a legitimate state
interest in preserving public access to the
shoreline, as evidenced by Article X, Sec-
tion 4 of the California Constitution and by
the Coastal Act, and because the tidelands
are under the public trust.126
B. Nollan: The Essential Nexus Test
Two years after the Whaler’s Village deci-
sion, a takings challenge to the Coastal
Commission’s permit-conditioning prac-
tices reached the United States Supreme
Court.  In Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion, the plaintiffs applied for a CDP to tear
down the existing small bungalow on their
Ventura beachfront property and build a
new three-story house with a seawall.127   The
Commission agreed to issue a CDP subject
to the condition that the plaintiffs grant a
lateral access easement, allowing the pub-
lic to pass across their beach property be-
tween the mean high tide line and the sea-
wall.128  The Commission justified the impo-
sition of the condition on the basis of its
findings that:
[T]he new house would increase
blockage of the view of the ocean,
thus contributing to the develop-
ment of “a wall of residential struc-
tures” that would prevent the public
“psychologically . . . from realizing a
stretch of coastline exists nearby that
they have every right to visit.”  The
new house would also increase pri-
vate use of the shorefront.  These
effects of construction of the house,
along with other area development,
would cumulatively “burden the
public’s ability to traverse to and
along the shorefront.”129
In addressing the plaintiff’s Fifth
Amendment claims, Justice Scalia-who de-
livered the majority’s decision-repeated the
oft-stated rule that “the right to exclude oth-
ers is one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly charac-
terized as property.”130   The Court found
that, had this right to exclude others been
taken away by simply requiring the easement
in the absence of the plaintiff’s application
to develop the property, there undoubtedly
would have been a constitutional viola-
tion.131   However, the easement required in
the case differed from an outright taking
because it occurred in the context of land
use regulation, and the Court had “long rec-
ognized that land use regulation does not
effect a taking if it ‘substantially advances
legitimate state interests.’”132   The Court
held that there would be a legitimate use of
the police power if the condition imposed
served the same state interest that could
have been the basis for denial of the permit
altogether.133   Nollan, thus, stands for the
proposition that there must be an “essen-
tial nexus” between the state interest that
would have been served by prohibiting the
development, or the need created by the
126.See Section II, supra.  “There is a clearly
enunciated state public policy in favor of allow-
ing public access to shoreline areas. [Citations]
One of the objects of the 1976 version of the
coastal act [sic] was to preserve existing public
rights of access to the shoreline and to expand
them for the future.”  Whaler’s Village, 173 Cal.
App. 3d at 254-255.  See also Grupe, 166 Cal. App.
3d. at 159-160.  The court also held that the right
of privacy does not extend to exclusion of the
public from access to public trust lands.  Whaler’s
Village, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 255.
127. 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 828-829.
130. Id. at 831.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 834.
133. at 836-837.
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development, and the exacted condition.134
In Nollan, the Coastal Commission be-
lieved that imposing a condition for public
access across the beach in front of the
Nollan development was justified by the
burden on public access that would be cre-
ated consequent to the blocking of views of
the beach by the new larger house.135   Since
the public would not be able to see the
beach, the Coastal Commission reasoned,
they would not realize there was beach avail-
able for their use beyond the house and
would, instead, go to the nearby public
beach, thereby increasing the use of that
beach, creating congestion and burdening
public access.136   The Court, however, in
applying its “essential nexus” test, held that
the burden on public access to the beach
created by the intensified development was
not the same type of “access” sought to be
mitigated by the permit condition.137   By dis-
tinguishing between types of public access
problems, the Court was drawing a narrow
definition of the meaning of “same” in the
connection required under the test.  The
Court found that the burdens on access cre-
ated by the development were visual and
psychological barriers and congestion prob-
lems on the nearby beach.138   That is not
the same burden, the Court said, that would
be relieved by the granting of a lateral ac-
cess easement.139   Since the burden created
by the development did not have an essen-
tial nexus with the easement, the condition,
therefore, constituted a taking requiring
compensation.140
While the essential nexus test as de-
scribed by Scalia seems quite narrow, in
practice, California courts have applied the
standard somewhat more loosely.  Follow-
ing Nollan, California courts began requir-
ing a “close,” or “substantial” connection
between the burden created by the devel-
opment and the condition imposed.141   Al-
though still similar to the rational basis test,
the essential nexus test has the practical
result of requiring a finding that the devel-
opment has a more direct, rather than inci-
dental, effect on public access.142
C. Dolan: The Rough Proportionality Test
State courts did not uniformly apply the
Nollan rule after it was handed down.  They
differed as to how close of a connection the
test required.143   In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the
United States Supreme Court clarified the
issue.  The Court not only reaffirmed the es-
sential nexus requirement, but also added a
second prong to the exactions test, requir-
ing that the burden of the impact and the
benefits of the condition imposed be “roughly
proportionate” in degree to each other.144
In Dolan, the Court held that even
where an essential nexus exists between the
134. Id.
135. Id. at 828-829.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 838.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 838-839.
140. Id.
141. Surfside Colony v. California Coastal Comm’n,
226 Cal. App. 3d 1260 (1991); Liberty v. California
Coastal Comm’n, 113 Cal. App. 3d 491 (1980); Rohn
v. Visalia, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1463 (1989).
142. Surfside Colony, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 1270.
143. The state standards can be divided into
three general groups: (1) deference is given to
the agency’s determination that there is an es-
sential nexus; (2) the exaction must be “specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable” to the impact
of the project, which means the connection must
be direct; and (3) the rational-nexus test, which
requires the connection to be substantial (Cali-
fornia). Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, “Take My
Beach, Please!”: Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional Analysis
of Development Exactions, 69 B.U.L. Rev. 823, 864-
870 (1989).
144. 512 U.S. 374, 388 (1994).
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conditions imposed and the burdens cre-
ated by the development, the “reasonable
relationship test adopted by a majority of
state courts” was not a definite enough stan-
dard to adequately balance the burdens.145
Even where an essential nexus existed, the
Court held that there would still be a taking
if the degree of the burden that the condi-
tion imposed on the property owner was
disproportionate to the burden of the
project on state interests.146   Hence, today’s
exactions test consists of two parts:
We must first determine whether the
“essential nexus” exists between the
“legitimate state interest” and the per-
mit condition exacted by the city. [Ci-
tation]  If we find that a nexus exists,
we must then decide the required
degree of connection between the ex-
actions and the projected impact of
the proposed development.147
D. Public Nuisance Principles and the
Lucas Exception
While the essential nexus and rough pro-
portionality tests can be used to measure the
legitimacy of the permitting authority’s exac-
tions, nuisance law can be an alternative theory
on the basis of which any property owner may
prohibit the actions of an adjacent landowner,
or by which any sort of regulatory action may
be justified.  In the issue at hand, both public
nuisance law, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Com-
mission, which created an exception from regu-
latory takings based on background principles
of nuisance, may apply.
The common law rule allows public nui-
sance cause of action where (1) there is a pub-
lic right, (2) there has been an interference with
that right, and (3) such interference is unrea-
sonable.148   Circumstances under which a
landowner’s activity may be found “unreason-
able” include: conduct that significantly inter-
feres with the public welfare, including comfort
and convenience, conduct that has been pro-
hibited by statute or administrative regulation,
or conduct that has significant effects on the
public right and is continually occurring or has
a “long-lasting effect.”149   A public official may
bring suit to abate a public nuisance.150
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
South Carolina argued a public nuisance
theory in response to a challenge to its
Beachfront Management Act.151   The Act was
passed by the state’s legislature in 1988 in
response to erosion and public access prob-
lems caused by development, paralleling the
situation faced by the California coast.152
145. Id. at 387, 391.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 386.
148. REST. 2D TORTS § 821B, Public Nuisance (1979).
149. Id.
150. Id. § 821C.
151. 505 U.S. 1003, 1006 (1992).
152. The Act made the following findings:
(1) There is a public interest in the beach because it (a) serves
as a protective barrier to property; (b) creates tourism that
contributes significantly to the economy, (c) provides habitat,
(d) and provides a place for citizens “to spend leisure time which
serves their physical and mental well-being.
. . . .
(3) Many miles of South Carolina’s beaches have been iden-
tified as critically eroding.
(4) Development unwisely has been sited too close to the beach/
dune system.  This type of development has jeopardized the
stability of the beach/dune system, accelerated erosion, and en-
dangered adjacent property.  It is in both the public and private
interests to protect the system from unwise development.
(5) The use of armoring in the form of hard erosion control
devices such as seawalls, bulkheads, and rip-rap . . . have in-
creased the vulnerability of beachfront property to damage from
wind and waves while contributing to the deterioration and loss
of the dry sand beach . . . .
(6) Erosion is a natural process which becomes a significant prob-
lem for man only when structures are erected in close proximity to
the beach/dune system.  It is in both the public and private inter-
ests to allow the beach/dune system space to accrete and erode in
its natural cycle.  This space can be provided only by discouraging
new construction in close proximity to the beach/dune system and
encouraging those who have erected structures too close to the
system to retreat from it.
(8) It is in the state’s best interest to protect and to promote
increased public access to South Carolina’s beaches for out-of-
state tourists and South Carolina residents alike.
S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-250.
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The petitioner Lucas had bought two
beachfront lots with the intention to develop
them for residential use, but the Beachfront
Management Act “had the direct effect of
barring petitioner from erecting any perma-
nent habitable structures on his two par-
cels.”153   Lucas contended the regulations
constituted a Fifth Amendment taking, but
the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected
the challenge, holding that the state had the
power to regulate uses of property that con-
stituted public nuisances without having to
pay compensation and characterizing the
South Carolina law as such a regulation.154
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that, in a case of loss of all economi-
cally beneficial use of land, the state was
justified in prohibiting the development
without compensation if “background prin-
ciples” of nuisance law would have prohib-
ited the development, questioning only
whether Lucas would have been prevented
from building under those principles.155   The
Court stated:
Any limitation so severe [as to pro-
hibit all economically beneficial use
of land] cannot be newly legislated
or decreed (without compensation),
but must inhere in the title itself, in
the restrictions that background prin-
ciples of the State’s law of property
and nuisance already place upon
land ownership.  A law or decree
with such an effect must, in other
words, do no more than duplicate
the result that could have been
achieved in the courts - by adjacent
landowners (or other uniquely af-
fected persons) under the State’s law
of private nuisance, or by the State
under its complementary power to
abate nuisances that affect the pub-
lic generally, or otherwise.156
In determining whether the land use regu-
lation is justified by nuisance principles or
is, in fact, a taking, the inquiry will entail:
[A]nalysis of, among other things, the
degree of harm to public lands and
resources, or adjacent private prop-
erty, posed by the claimant’s pro-
posed activities [citations], the social
value of the claimant’s activities and
their suitability to the locality in ques-
tion [citations], and the relative ease
with which the alleged harm can be
avoided through measures taken by
the claimant and the government.157
Under Lucas, therefore, even a total taking
by a regulatory action may be constitutional
if the government could have forbid the use
of the property under background principles
of nuisance law and could justify the regu-
lation by balancing the public and private
interests according to the factors above.
VI. A Proposed Solution: How the Agen-
cies Can Apply the Law to Preserve
Access in Malibu
The impetus has been building for a
new look at the status of exactions jurispru-
dence in California in light of the Nollan/
Dolan essential-nexus-plus-rough-propor-
tionality test.  The constitutionality of the
California Coastal Commission’s exactions
on beachfront development has been chal-
lenged by Geffen and is likely to continue
to be controversial until a property owner is
successful in getting his takings claims
brought to the high courts and decided on
the merits.  The situation in Malibu contains
the perfect ingredients to stir up such litiga-
tion since there has been a great deal of
153. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
154. Id. at 1010.
155. Id. at 1031.
156. Id. at 1029.
157. Id. at 1030-1031.
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158. 1st Am. Compl., supra note 71, ¶ 127.
159. E-mail comments from Steve Hudson,
supra note 53.
160. Coastal Development Permit application,
supra note 83, at 21-26.  The author’s experience
private development, public beach access
is very limited, the agencies are aggressive
with imposing and opening public access,
and the beachfront landowners are power-
ful and affluent enough to fight.  For those
reasons, the suit filed by David Geffen has
been used in this article as an example of
the conflict and the arguments the
beachfront property owners may make.
How the state defends its permitting actions
is important because it will determine the
extent to which the state can protect public
access to the beach and preserve the pub-
lic tidelands.
This section shall discuss the follow-
ing: (a) how the Coastal Commission meets
the constitutional exactions test; (b) how
involving State Lands in legal action in co-
ordination with the Coastal Commission
would make the case for public access stron-
ger; (c) how State Lands can initiate its own
litigation on a nuisance claim; and (d) how
the Coastal Commission may use the nui-
sance argument to further support satisfac-
tion of the exactions test.
A. The Coastal Commission Can Defeat
Constitutional Challenges to Exactions
In the Geffen permit, which is standard
and very similar to most other CDPs since
Nollan, the Commission imposed access
conditions after making findings that the
development causes erosion to the beach
and has a physical impact on the public trust
lands and the public’s ability to access the
beach.  Nonetheless, Geffen argued that the
Coastal Commission did not comply with
the constitutional requirements when im-
posing the lateral access easement on his
Coastal Justice: The Case for Public Access
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property because the Commission did not
make findings determining whether the per-
mit conditions had a rational relationship to,
a nexus with, or were roughly proportional to
the impacts generated by the development.158
The Coastal Commission, however,
claims that since Nollan the agency has paid
diligent attention to ensuring its actions are
justified under the constitutional stan-
dards.159   Before issuing a permit, the
Commission’s procedure is to prepare a
“Staff Report” that makes findings showing
the connection between the condition im-
posed and the burden created by the de-
velopment.  These Staff Reports explain how
the development creates a need for more
beach access for the public and how the
easement furthers public access.160   In mak-
ing such findings, the Coastal Commission
examines the nature of the development
and the characteristics of the surrounding
area, the potential impacts of the develop-
ment and its obligation to avoid those im-
pacts, the need for the development and the
advantages or disadvantages of any avail-
able alternatives, and explains why the con-
dition is the best accommodation of both
the private and the public needs.161
The Geffen Staff Report follows the same
practice.  In the Geffen Staff Report, the
Coastal Commission made clear findings of
the development’s impacts and stated the
connection between the impacts and the
condition imposed.  The Report’s evaluation
began with the following statement:
[P]ast Commission review of shore-
line residential projects in Malibu has
shown that such development re-
with CDP permit findings and conditions led her
to believe that the Geffen permit is not unusual
and can serve as a standard from which other
similarly situated properties may also be analyzed.
161. See generally, Coastal Development Per-
mit application, supra note 83.
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sults in potential individual and cu-
mulative adverse effects to coastal
processes, shoreline sand supply, and
public access.  Shoreline develop-
ment, if not properly designed to mini-
mize such adverse effects, may result
in encroachment on lands subject to
the public trust (thus physically ex-
cluding the public); interference with
the natural shoreline processes nec-
essary to maintain publicly-owned
tidelands and other public beach ar-
eas; overcrowding or congestion of
such tideland or beach areas; and vi-
sual or psychological interference
with the public’s access to and the
ability to use public tideland areas.
In order to accurately determine what
adverse effects to coastal processes
will result from the proposed project,
it is necessary to analyze the pro-
posed project in relation to charac-
teristics of the project site shoreline,
location of development on the
beach, and wave action.162
Based on scientific evidence (see Section
IV.B.2, above), the Report explains in detail
how Geffen’s proposed seawall, as well as
development on the beach generally, has
the effect of eroding the beach.163   The Re-
port determines that erosion caused by the
seawall would have the following effect on
the public’s access to the beach:
First, changes in the shoreline profile,
particularly changes in the slope of the
profile . . . alter the usable area under
public ownership.  A beach that rests
either temporarily or permanently at a
steeper angle than under natural con-
ditions will have less horizontal dis-
tance between the mean low water
and mean high water lines.  This re-
duces the actual area in which the
public can pass on their own property.
The second effect on access is through
a progressive loss of sand as shore
material is not available to nourish the
bar.  The lack of an effective bar can
allow such high wave energy on the
shoreline that beach materials may
be lost far offshore where it is no
longer available to nourish the beach.
The effect of this on the public is again
a loss of area between the mean high
water line and the actual water.  Third
. . . bulkheads cumulatively affect
public access by causing acceler-
ated and increased erosion on ad-
jacent public beaches.164
In sum, the Report found that Geffen’s
building of a seawall would cause an accel-
eration of erosion to the beach, which im-
pacted public access by diminishing the tide-
lands and reducing the area available for
public use. The Report also considered the
cumulative effect of Geffen’s development
with others’ development,165  and deter-
mined that the project would exacerbate the
shrinkage of the public beach. Assuming the
science is correct, the development harms
162. Coastal Development Permit application,
supra note 83, at 9.
163. Id. at 9-10, 16-26.
164. Id. at 22.
165. It is of note that the Coastal Commission
cannot consider the impacts of Geffen’s develop-
ment by itself, but must consider the effect of
Geffen’s development in light of its potential to have
a greater effect when combined with the impacts of
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nearby development. Although not at issue here,
this analysis is required by the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (applicable to federal agencies)
and California’s parallel statute, the California En-
vironmental Quality Act (applicable to state agen-
cies).  See also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409
(1976) (Considering cumulative effects is a proce-
dural requisite when analyzing environmental harms
caused by development that occurs within the area
of other approved or foreseeable projects.).
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the public interest in access to the tidelands
and is contrary to the principles of the
Coastal Act, which is sufficient to allow the
Coastal Commission to exercise the state’s
police power to prohibit the development
altogether.  In the interest of balancing pub-
lic and private rights, however, the Coastal
Commission allowed Geffen a CDP but, in
return for that privilege, imposed a condi-
tion requiring Geffen to record an offer to
dedicate an easement for public access
across a strip of the private beach contigu-
ous along the tide line.  To pass constitu-
tional muster, the condition imposed on
Geffen must satisfy the two-pronged exac-
tions test, establishing that the condition’s
connection is both essential and roughly
proportionate to the project’s impact.
Under the first prong, the essential
nexus test asks whether the state interest
that would have been served by denial of
the permit is the same state interest that is
served by imposing the mitigating condition.
In this case, the proposed seawall would
cause the width of the beachfront to be di-
minished by erosion, thus harming public
access.  Since the permit condition provides
for public access across the beachfront, the
condition satisfies Nollan’s “essential nexus”
test because the type of public access af-
fected by the development is access across
the beachfront, and the lateral access ease-
ment required by the permit would allow
access across the beachfront.
Under the second prong, the rough
proportionality test asks whether the degree
of the burden on the property owner cre-
ated by the condition is roughly proportion-
ate to the burden on the state interest cre-
ated by the development’s impacts.  Here,
the impacts affecting the public’s past,
present, and future interest in coastal ac-
cess are sufficient to show that the burden
on the state interest is significant and pro-
portional to the burden on the landowner.
This is especially so since the landowner
derives at least some benefit from the con-
ditions imposed.
Aerial photographs of the coast dem-
onstrate that there has been significant ero-
sion on Broad Beach since its develop-
ment.166   Past development by the property
owner, such as Geffen’s house, has already
contributed to erosion and caused harm to
the public beach.  Additional development,
like Geffen’s proposed seawall, increases
and intensifies erosion, as illustrated by the
Staff Report.  New development also length-
ens the amount of time the development
lasts, causing the accelerated erosion to
continue to occur further into the future.
Both the new addition and the existing
structures, therefore, are likely to continue
to cause erosion of the tidelands for years
to come.  The lateral access easement merely
compensates the public for the continuing
diminution of the public lands and, conse-
quently, of the area available for public use.
Hence, the burdens on the state interest and
the landowner’s interest already seem to be
roughly proportional.
The case for rough proportionality,
though, becomes even stronger when tak-
ing into account the fact that the landowner
actually derives a benefit from the condition.
As the Nollan Court recognized, “land use
regulation does not effect a taking if it sub-
stantially advances legitimate state inter-
ests.”167   Since the Court did not question
that public access to the beach was a legiti-
mate state interest, the Coastal Commission
could have denied Geffen a permit to add
166. See the text and citations at footnote
103.  In particular, Map No. 105 designates Broad
Beach’s shoreline condition as “present devel-
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on to his house without effecting a taking
of his property.  Rather than prohibiting the
development, the restriction allows Geffen
to add onto the property, which directly in-
creases the value of the property.  As a Cali-
fornia court has recognized:
[A property owner] has received a
substantial benefit by being allowed
to proceed with the development of
his property and to thereby greatly
increase its value.  The benefit in-
volved is that the development is per-
mitted on the coast-an extremely lim-
ited resource-in exchange for provi-
sions to ensure maximum public ac-
cess to, and use of, the tidelands.168
Geffen benefits from the condition by
being able to do what he otherwise would
not be able to do and thereby increasing the
value of his property.  Moreover, Geffen ben-
efits from similar conditions placed on neigh-
boring properties, as their unrestricted de-
velopment would have caused erosion to the
beach in front of Geffen’s property, decreas-
ing its value.  Also, the increased value of the
properties in the area indirectly increases the
value of Geffen’s own property.  Thus, in light
of the significant harms to the state interest
that follow from the existing and additional
development, and accounting for the ben-
168. Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 176.  In Grupe,
the plaintiff applied for a permit to build a large
home with a seawall on his beachfront lot.  The
California Coastal Commission required as a con-
dition to the permit that Grupe dedicate a public
access easement along the beach.  Id. at 155-156.
169. State Lands created the Division of Envi-
ronmental Planning and Management in order to,
inter alia, “serve as the liaison between the [State
Lands] Commission and the California Coastal
Commission,” and to monitor the whether approved
projects are implementing mitigation measures.
California State Lands Commission, About DEPM,
at http://www.slc.ca.gov/Division_Pages/DEPM/
About_DEPM.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
170. Author’s experience, supra note 50.  As an
efits that accrue to the landowner from the
conditions imposed, the lateral access con-
dition meets the rough proportionality test.
B. The Agencies Can Join Forces to
Exert Legal Pressure
The Coastal Commission and State
Lands are united in their missions to protect
the public’s right of access to the coast.  As
discussed in Section III, above, the Coastal
Commission, through their Coastal Access
Program, notifies the State Lands
Commission’s Division of Environmental
Planning and Management169  as to the par-
ticular OTD it wants accepted next.  The agen-
cies are, thus, cooperating with each other
in the exchange of information, but they pur-
sue their own actions thereafter without fur-
ther consultation.  The agencies could bet-
ter serve their objectives if they extended their
cooperation beyond regulation and admin-
istration by taking coordinated legal action
against specific beachfront property owners
who interfere with public access.
The Coastal Commission’s success has
been hampered by noncompliance with per-
mit conditions170  and constitutional chal-
lenges to its regulatory authority to exact ease-
ments from development applicants.171   In-
stead of leaving the Coastal Commission to
intern in the Coastal Commission’s Legal Enforce-
ment Division, I had access to the violation com-
plaint log book and permit files.  It was readily
observable to me that there were vastly more vio-
lations than the Coastal Commission has re-
sources to handle.  No regulatory scheme can be
successful without “teeth,” but neither can it be
successful if there are teeth on paper but not
enough money and staff to give it teeth in prac-
tice.  One example of this is discussed in Section
IV.B.1, above, where fourteen of the properties on
Broad Beach that had permit conditions forbid-
ding signs had posted the “No Trespassing” signs.
171. As discussed in Section IV; including the
Nollan and Geffen cases, as well as Remmenga,
Whaler’s Village, and Grupe.
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enforce permit violations and defend takings
challenges alone, State Lands can take a more
proactive role and become involved in the le-
gal battle against the noncomplying property
owner.  While State Lands has successfully
made easements available for public access
through its authority as a government agency
and pursuant to statutory grant, the agency
has an untapped source of legal authority that
can give it greater power to fight for public
access-the public nuisance doctrine.
As discussed earlier, State Lands holds
legal title to the tidelands and the beachfront
easements as trustee for the people of the
California.  As trustee, State Lands has the
duty to protect the people’s property rights in
those lands.  Where an adjacent property
owner’s development is causing harm to the
people’s property rights in the tidelands and
beach easements, as trustee of those public
lands, State Lands can bring a public nuisance
suit against the property owner to remove the
harmful development.  The legal right to pro-
tect the public’s interest in the land as a con-
sequence of its status as trustee is distinct from
the statutorily granted authority that lies in
State Lands as an agency. Thus, claiming au-
thority to stop the development in this man-
ner would be based on the public’s common
law property rights, rather than on the author-
ity of a governmental agency.
By taking this action, State Lands can
back up the Coastal Commission’s defense
of a specific permit against the
noncompliant landowner.  In that way, the
agencies can take advantage of the legal
rights belonging to both the regulatory
agency and the general public at the same
time.  With the pressure of two agencies on
the landowner, and possibly two lawsuits
on the table, the landowner is more likely
to accede to the conditions and comply.
C. State Lands Can Exert Property
Rights Under Nuisance Principles
Common law public nuisance prin-
ciples prohibit a landowner from using his
land in such a way so as to cause harm to
the public’s rights.172   Here, nuisance law
can be applied because: (1) There is a pub-
lic property right in the tidelands and lat-
eral easements, as well as a right to access
those lands; (2) The adjacent beachfront
development accelerates erosion of those
public lands, which interferes with the
public’s rights because it diminishes the
public’s property and the land available for
access.  The property owner also interferes
with public access by maintaining “No Tres-
passing” signs and guards who chase the
public off the beach.  Finally, (3) such inter-
ference is unreasonable because the public’s
comfort and convenience in using the beach
is prevented; the Coastal Commission has
prohibited the signs and guards and has re-
stricted development, and the development
constitutes a continuing nuisance with per-
manent effects because erosion continues
and the sand is forever lost.
Since a public official may bring a pub-
lic nuisance action, and because State
Lands also has a duty to protect the rights
of the public to the tidelands and the lat-
eral access easements it holds, State Lands
has the legal authority to be able to bring a
nuisance claim against a beachfront prop-
erty owner whose development threatens
to erode the public’s land.  Such would be
applicable in Geffen’s case, where his sea-
wall accelerates erosion of the beach.
In bringing a nuisance claim against the
beachfront developer, the legal rights ex-
erted by State Lands could be considered
in the context of property law, rather than
as regulatory action like the Coastal
172. REST. 2D TORTS § 821B, supra note 148.
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Commission’s.  Doing so in conjunction with
the Coastal Commission’s enforcement ac-
tion would that make legal action against
the violator a double threat.  Moreover, the
Coastal Commission may be able to avoid
proving that it meets the more complicated
Nollan and Dolan tests if nuisance litigation
were first initiated by State Lands.
D. The Coastal Commission Can Apply
Nuisance Principles To Support
Exactions
The Coastal Commission may also be
able to use nuisance principles to abate vio-
lations and support its exactions by apply-
ing the analysis in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council.  Once the permit condition
is found to mitigate the harm caused by the
development (which is the nuisance) such
that the essential nexus test is satisfied, the
Lucas decision can potentially be used to
support a finding of rough proportionality
under the takings test.  Even in the context
of all loss of economic value, the Lucas deci-
sion accepts that existing principles of nui-
sance are a sufficient basis for regulation.173
Thus, it implicitly satisfies the rough propor-
tionality prong because the condition im-
posed on the property owner (the regula-
tion) is proportional to the harm caused by
the development (the nuisance).
Under Lucas, where the landowner de-
velops his land in a way that causes a nui-
sance to the public’s rights, the Coastal Com-
mission can prohibit the proposed new de-
velopment, even if to do so would otherwise
be a total regulatory taking.  Having author-
ity to outright prohibit the action, the Coastal
Commission can, instead, impose a condi-
tion for that same reason.174  The Coastal Com-
mission can, therefore, argue that the condi-
tion must at least be roughly proportional to
the harm, since the harm would have allowed
the more stringent action of completely pro-
hibiting the development.
Although the erosion may be found to
constitute a nuisance to the public property
in the easements and tidelands, Lucas does
not automatically vindicate the regulation.
The court must balance the interests at stake
before the prohibition can support a possible
noncompensable taking.  The balancing fac-
tors set forth in Lucas included:
[1] the degree of harm to public
lands and resources, or adjacent pri-
vate property, posed by the
claimant’s proposed activities [cita-
tions], [2] the social value of the
claimant’s activities and [3] their suit-
ability to the locality in question [ci-
tations], and [4] the relative ease
with which the alleged harm can be
avoided through measures taken by
the claimant and the government.175
First, the harm to public lands and re-
sources is great.  The public lands (the tide-
lands and easements) are harmed as ero-
sion from adjacent development shrinks
their area.  The resource value of the beach
is also harmed since the land available to
public use is diminished along with the ero-
sion.  The public’s use and enjoyment of the
beach is also interfered with by the “No Tres-
passing” signs and policing of the beach by
security guards.
Second, the people of the state have
twice declared the preservation of the coast
to be a social value of fundamental impor-
tance.176   The social value to the private
property owner is in his use of it as a
beachfront residence, but the slight detri-
173. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010.
174. See Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, discussed at Sec-
tion V.B, supra.
175. Lucas, at 1030-1031.
176. See Section II.B.3, supra.
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ment to that value caused by enforcing the
right of the public to use the tidelands and
easements is outweighed by the greater
public purposes.  The state does recognize
that there is social value in preserving the
property rights of the individual (such rights
are essential to the preservation of our
democratic ideals) and does not want to
prohibit all development on the beach, but
it also needs to protect the public’s inter-
est.  A 25-foot lateral access easement
across the sandy beach seems to balance
both interests by mitigating the harm to the
public while still allowing the property
owner to economically benefit from the de-
velopment of his land.
Third, the sustainability of such devel-
opment on the beachfront does not weigh
in favor of the private owner.  The Coastal
Commission’s archives are full of applica-
tions for the building of emergency revet-
ments during winter storms and for rebuild-
ing of homes that have crumbled from sub-
sidence.177   The tremendous amount of
damage to beachfront homes, particularly
in Malibu, from storms has been well docu-
mented by the media.178   As the beach con-
tinues to erode away, development is fur-
ther threatened.  While natural processes
of accretion could repair the erosion to the
beach were the development completely
removed, that would be unreasonable and
would not be proportional to the harm to
the property owner’s rights.  So long as the
development must exist, the harm of ero-
sion to the public’s lands will continue to
occur and cannot be avoided.
Fourth, allowing the public to walk
across a portion of the beach fronting the
development can easily compensate for the
harm to public access resulting from the ero-
sion of the public lands.  Where there is al-
ready an easement in place allowing the
public to do so, and the property owner in-
terferes with the right to cross by posting
signs, the harm is easily avoidable simply
by requiring him to remove them.
In so finding the beachfront land-
owner’s use of his property to be out-
weighed by the public’s use of the adjacent
tidelands and easements, and having found
previously that the erosion of the beach and
the “No Trespassing” signs are a nuisance
to the public trust lands and public access,
the Coastal Commission could, therefore,
argue that background principles of nui-
sance law would have given the agency
power to abate the nuisance, so its exac-
tions are constitutional.  The practical re-
sult of getting an order of abatement for the
nuisance would be to prohibit the develop-
ment shown to cause erosion (such as the
seawall in Geffen’s case), or, as the case may
be, require the beachfront landowner to re-
move the signs interfering with the public’s
use and enjoyment of the public lands.
VIII. Conclusion
In sum, the Coastal Commission’s
practice of requiring a lateral access ease-
ment in return for permitting development
is constitutionally permissible.  Should the
landowner interfere with the public’s access
or bring a takings suit to invalidate the ac-
cess condition, the Coastal Commission can
satisfy the Nollan and Dolan tests by show-
ing that the erosion caused by the develop-
ment harms the public tidelands such that
177. Author’s experience, supra note 50.  The
author reviewed all the permits for development
on Broad Beach.
178. E.g., Eric Malnic & Julia Scheeres, Re-
prieve from the Rain Weather: Southland Gets a Break
from Punishing Storms.  The Exception is Malibu, Where
Surf Batters Homes and Yards, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10,
1998, at B1; Jeff Wilson, Mudslides Add to Troubles
in Malibu, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 9, 1994, at
A3;Wire Reports Compilation, Storm Rains More
Grief on the Nation, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 8, 1994,
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there is an essential nexus with the lateral
access condition, and that the erosion causes
harm to the public that is roughly propor-
tional to the burden on the property owner..
The Coastal Commission can further support
a finding of rough proportionality by show-
ing that the erosion is a nuisance and can be
regulated according to Lucas.
The case for public access could be
made even more compelling by involving
State Lands by taking the offense and initi-
ating an action against the landowner who
refuses to comply with the Coastal
Commission’s requirements.  By invoking
nuisance law, State Lands can protect the
public’s property rights from the harmful use
of the adjacent property by the beachfront
resident.  The landowner will then have two
forces with claims against him, and that
additional pressure is likely to influence him
to comply.  Together, the California Coastal
Commission and the State Lands Commis-
sion can be a powerful force in protecting
the public’s access.
Epilogue
A victory for the environment, Geffen
was forced to drop his cause of action for
an unconstitutional taking of private prop-
erty. And in April of 2004, the Superior Court
of California sustained the Coastal
Commission’s General Demurrer to the
other causes of action (mostly issues of pro-
cedural compliance under CEQA), dismiss-
ing all claims objecting to the opening of
the easement to public access.179   In that
ruling, the judge opined:
[Geffen] is pursuing his own economic
interests by attempting, now that he
has been permitted to develop his
coastal property, to renege on his of-
fers to dedicate public access to the
beachfront that will otherwise be
blocked by that development.180
On October 1, 2004, Geffen filed a Sixth
Amended Complaint, attempting to suffi-
ciently plead the claims demurred with leave
to amend, and, this time, the Coastal Com-
mission cross-complained for declaratory re-
lief and civil fines for violations of the Coastal
Act.181   The Coastal Commission’s cross-com-
plaint could lead to further inquiry into the
constitutionality of the agency’s practice of
conditioning permits upon the dedication of
a lateral public access easement.
at A6.
179. General Demurrer to 4th Am. Compl., 1-
3, City of Malibu v. Access for All, No. BC277034
(Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County, Apr. 12, 2004).
180. Id. at 2.
181. The case history of proceedings and docu-
ments filed is available at the Los Angeles Su-
perior Court website.  Use the civil case sum-
mary search function and enter in the case num-
ber BC277034 at http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/
civilCaseSummary/index.asp?CaseType=Civil.
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